We implement a formal test of Shimer's (2005) model of job assignment in the presence of coordination frictions. The test uses a complete general equilibrium labor market with heterogeneous workers and firms. We assume a production technology with comparative advantage that yields testable implications about the assortative matching of high-productivity workers to high-productivity firms. The empirical implementation uses longitudinally linked employer-employee data from the U.S. and France, which have been summarized using the first two moments stratified by firm size. The full structural model is estimated using the method of simulated moments, where the fit is obtained using adaptive simulated annealing. The estimated equilibrium correlation between individual and firm heterogeneity varies by size class of firm. For the U.S., these correlations range from slightly negative (smallest firm size) to zero. The pattern in the French data is essentially the same but the negative relation is somewhat stronger in the smallest sizes. Under the assumption that low-productivity workers have a comparative advantage in high-productivity firms, we find, consistent with Shimer's model, that high-productivity workers are more likely to be employed in less productive jobs.
Introduction
It now well established that the statistical decomposition of wage rates into portions due to observable characteristics, unmeasured individual heterogeneity, unmeasured employer heterogeneity, and statistical residual attributes substantial variation to the unmeasured individual and employer components.
1 There is less agreement on the sign and magnitude of the statistical correlation between these components of heterogeneity in the observed samples of workers. Some find a small or negative correlation (Abowd et al. 1999) . Others find some evidence of positive correlation (Woodcock forthcoming; Abowd et al. 2003) .
What might explain between unmeasured individual and empoyer heterogeneity? Roy (1951) posited an optimal sorting of workers with heterogeneous abilities that were differentially productive in different occupations. Employer heterorgeneity resulted from different occupation mixes across industries and firm sizes. Mortensen (2003) demonstrates that the within occupation decomposition into unmeasured individual and employer components is just as strong as the between occupation decomposition, which is not consistent with Roy's model. Mortensen (2003) posits a collection of alternative explanations based on search and recruitment costs among employers and wokers with heterogeneous productivity. He provides empirical analyses of the Danish labor market that are consistent with the structure models he describes. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) use Mortensen-style models to study the French labor market.
Our goal is to explain the observed correlations between individual and firm heterogeneity components. For this task, we adopt in this paper the model of job assignment with coordination frictions developed in Shimer (2005) . In what follows, we describe those features of the model that are essential to understanding our analysis. Shimer's model yields a wage offer function that depends on both the type of the individual and the type of job. Furthermore, it predicts which jobs will result in equilibrium. These are the two essential features needed to construct theoretical moments of the joint distribution of individual and firm heterogeneity. Finally, the model makes sharp predictions that we can test about how observed job assignments vary according to the types of the agents involved. The structural model and the estimated parameters help us assess whether and to what extent the negative correlations we observe between individual and firm heterogeneity components are due to negative assortative matching, to mismatch, and to selection effects.
The key contribution of Shimer's model is to formally introduce the notion of coordination frictions into the assignment process. If firms and workers could condition wage offers and applications on the behavior of all other agents in the economy, it would always be possible to get a frictionless and optimal assignment. Shimer argues that such complete coordination of the plans of all actors is unrealistic. Workers and firms can coordinate their behavior, but only imperfectly. The model captures this idea by two refinements to worker and firm strategies. First, firms can condition their wage offers on the type, but not the identity of the worker. Second, all workers of the same type are presumed to follow the same application strategy. These simple but powerful assumptions generate equilibrium unemployment, mismatch of worker and firm types, and wage dispersion that depends on both firm and worker type.
Section 2 specifies the Shimer model as we implement it. Section 3 derives the empirical implications for the moments of the heterogeneity when that heterogeneity has been estimated using the statistical models cited above. Section 4 summarizes the data. Section 5 summarizes the econometric specification. Section 6 shows our results. Section 7 concludes.
Shimer's Model for Matching Workers and Firms

Job Assignment with Coordination Frictions
The economy consists of workers and firms. Each firm has one vacancy to fill by hiring one worker. Firms choose wage offers for each worker. Workers then choose where they want to apply for a job. Based on the pool of applicants, the firms hire one worker to fill the vacancy. Workers and firms only differ in productive type. There are M types of worker and N types of firms. When a worker of type m is hired into a job of type n, the output of production is x m,n .
A decentralized equilibrium of the coordination friction economy is characterized by application strategies for all workers and wage offers from all employers to each type of worker. It turn out that this equilibrium depends only on the nature of the production technology and the number of each type of worker and of each type of firm. Out of a total measure µ of workers in the economy, we assume that µ m of them have productive type m ∈ {1 . . . M}. Likewise, out of a total measure ν of firms in the economy, ν n of them have productive type n ∈ {1 . . . N}. Although it will not matter in the final equilibrium, we follow Shimer in naming individual workers by (m, i) and individual firms by (n, j) where the first term is the type of the agent, and the second term is the agent's name. Thus, each worker or firm can be uniquely identified.
Equilibrium Wage Offers, Applications and Hiring
The Worker's Problem
Suppose each firm, (n, j), has chosen its menu of wage offers. Firms cannot offer different wages to workers of the same type. Consequently, a worker of type m must choose an application strategy based on the set of offers, w m, (n,,j) , across all (n, j). The model assumes that a worker can make only one application, so a feasible strategy for worker (m, i) is a probability distribution p m,i that specifies the probability with which she applies to each firm.
Since all workers of type m follow the same strategy in the coordination friction economy, and since we assume that the number of workers of each type is very large, it is easier to think in terms of the queue of applicants of type m to each firm. That is, the number of applications from type m workers to any firm is approximately Poisson with parameter q m,(n,,j) = p m,(n,,j) µ m
The equilibrium queue lengths must leave all workers of type m indifferent between applying for any two jobs. To satisfy this condition for each type of worker, all jobs for which there is a positive probability of application have the same expected income. In addition, all jobs for which the worker of type m does not apply have strictly less expected income. The expected income from any job for which q m,(n,,j) > 0 is: (n,,j) 1 − e −q m, (n,,j) q m, (n,,j) w m,(n,,j)
where (n,,j) is the measure of workers with productive type at least m + 1. That is, this is the expected number of applications from workers who are strictly better than a worker of type m. Using the properties of the Poisson distribution, the expected income from (n, j) is the probability of getting the job times the wage, where the probability of getting the job is the probability that there are no applications from a better worker (the first term on the right-hand side of (1) times the probability that the worker actually ends up applying for the job (the term in the numerator) and is chosen from among all other applicants of the same type (the term in the denominator). As long as there are expected incomes, ν m and queue lengths that satisfy 1, workers have no incentive to deviate.
The Firm's Problem
Firms choose wage offers for workers of each productive type and a hiring protocol that maximizes expected profits given the queueing behavior of workers. Shimer (2005) shows that the optimal hiring strategy is to choose the applicant of highest productive type. When pursuing the optimal strategy, the expected profit of firm (n, j) is given by:
Competitive Search Equilibrium
Shimer defines the equilibrium for this economy as follows:
Definition 1 A Competitive Search Equilibrium consists of wage offers, w, queue lengths q and expected incomes v chosen so that firm's profits (2)are maximized, worker's expected incomes are respected as in (1), and the expected number of applications from type m workers does not exceed the total measure of such workers, µ m :
The competitive equilibrium turns out to be unique. Furthermore, the equilibrium queue lengths, q are the same as those that would be chosen by a social planner who chooses queue lengths, or equivalently, application probabilities for workers. The social planner is restricted to queue lengths that do not condition on individual identities. The goal of the social planner is to maximize expected aggregate output. In this setting, it turns out that the optimal queue lengths will satisfy the first-order conditions:
where the dependence on the firm's identity, j, has been suppressed because it is not relevant. Given these queue lengths, and the requirement that workers' expected incomes be balanced as in (1), the equilibrium wages must be:
Equations (4) and (5) provide all the information that is required for our estimation strategy. Given assumptions about the production technology, x m,n and the measure of each type of firm and worker, wages and queue lengths are determined. Although the equilibrium queue lengths have no observable counterpart, we can use them to derive the expected number of workers of type m that are ultimately become employed in firms of type n:
Empirical Predictions and Sorting
In equilibrium, the structure of sorting depends on the properties of the production function. Shimer examines various cases. First, if the production function is supermodular, the Shimer's Proposition 3 shows that Q m,n is strictly increasing in n when it is positive. In addition, a more productive job is more likely to be filled, a worker is less likely to obtain a more productive job conditional on applying for it, and a worker's wage is increasing in the employer's productivity. Workers are compensated not only through their wage but through their hiring probability. In such an economy, one can construct examples in which less productive workers earn a higher wage. Similarly, one can construct examples in which the unemployment probability is increasing in a worker's type.
Shimer also studies the case without comparative advantage in which the ratio of output of workers of two different types is equal in firms of different types (output being, for instance, multiplicative in the type of the worker and the type of the firm). In this case, mismatch is possible: a more productive firm is likely to employ a less productive worker and, reciprocally, a less productive firm is likely to employ a more productive worker. Shimer also notes that mismatch is pervasive even when there is supermodularity unless highly productive workers have a very large productive advantage in high-productivity firms. Still, he shows that highproductivity workers are more likely to be employed in high-productivity firms.
In contrast, if there is some comparative advantage for low skill workers in high productivity jobs, (output is additive, not multiplicative as above, in the two types of workers and firms case), then assortative matching may fail. This is the case that we will investigate in the following.
From the Model to the Moments
The estimation of worker and firm effects as in Abowd et al. (1999) (henceforth AKM99) has to be derived from an OLS estimation procedure. We establish in this section the formulas showing the link between the queue lengths and wage function of the Shimer economy and the second order moments of worker and firm effects.
We will now consider only two types of workers, so M = 2. In the Shimer economy, in any given firm, all workers of the same type are equally productive, and therefore equally paid. Rewriting in full all equations derived in the previous section for our case of M = 2, one gets:
Now, let us consider the same economy with two types of workers and N types of firms, with λ m,n the number of m type workers in firm n, and w m,n the corresponding wage. We have λ 1,n = ν n e −q 2,n (1 − e q 1,n ) and λ 2,n = ν n (1 − e q 2,n ). In the AKM99 framework, the wage equation writes log w m,n = θ m + ψ n + ε m,n Hence, there are only two worker effects to estimate and N firm effects. We suppose that the estimation conditions in AKM99 hold, so that the worker effects θ m and the firm effects ψ n can be estimated. The worker and firm effects are given by the minimization of
in which λ m,n is defined as above. The worker and firm effects are identifiable only up to a constant Λ (see AKM99 and Abowd et al. (2002) ), and straightforward computations (see Appendix) yield:
We will set Λ = 0 without loss of generality. The within-group variances and covariances of the worker and firm effects can also be determined for any group K of firms:
Using formulas (7)- (8) the covariance and variances are thus only functions of the number of each type of worker per firm λ m,n and of the wage w m,n . These two variables are indeed determined in the Shimer economy; it is therefore possible to link the production function and structure of the firm and worker population with the variances and covariances of the worker and firm effects. Now, we must detail how these moments are computed.
The Moments of the Underlying Data
The theoretical model explains the first and second moments of the joint distribution of θ and ψ within employer size-classes across sectors. We compute the empirical moments of individual-and firm-effects estimated from matched employer-employee data. The French data are from the Déclarations annuelles des donnés sociales (DADS), a 1/25th sample of the French work force with information from 1976-1996. The U.S. data are from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics Program (LEHD), universe data for four large American States with information from 1990-2003. A detailed description of each of these data sources is found in Appendix B.
Direct Estimation of θ and ψ
Following Abowd et al. (1999) , we decompose the annualized wage in each job as:
where 2 See Appendix for the general case with a continuum of firms.
• J(i, t) is the dominant employer of individual i at time t
• θ i is the individual effect. We further decompose this as:
where u i η is the effect of observable individual characteristics, including sex, race and education, and α i is the effect of unobservables.
• x i,t β is the effect of individual labor market experience, tenure, and labor market attachment, interacted with sex.
• ψ J(i,t) is the firm effect. Abowd et al. (2002) document the identification strategy and the details of implementing the full least squares solution for estimating equation (12).
Preliminary Analysis of the Moments
We compute the empirical moments within ten employer size-classes for each sector. Recall that the unit of analysis is the individual job history observation in the matched data. To produce size classes, we compute the deciles of the distribution of employer size across all of the job-level observations, and assign each observation to its corresponding decile. Therefore, within each size class there are roughly the same number of observations. Figure 1 compares the empirical correlation between the worker and firm effects by employer size class for the French and U.S. data. In the French data, at the lowest size classes, worker and firm effects are very negatively correlated. This negative correlation gets weaker as employer size increases. By contrast, we observe a hump-shaped relationship between worker and firm effects in the U.S. data. In firms with very low or very high employment, there is a negative correlation between worker and firm effects, while the correlations are positive at intermediate firm sizes. However, the negative and positive correlations in the U.S. data are substantially smaller in magnitude than the most negative correlation in the French data. This is consistent with the finding in (Abowd et al. 2002) that the correlation between worker and firm effects are negative in France, and approximately zero in the U.S..
In part, the hump-shaped relationship in the LEHD data is an artefact of aggregation. Figures 2,3 and 4 show the correlation between worker and firm effects across employer size class broken out by sector. Each figure shows one of three patterns that appear in the data. In the Agricultural, Mining, Manufacturing, Construction and Wholesale sectors, we observe correlations that are concave and increasing in employer size. By contrast,in Information, Finance and Real Estate, there is a very pronounced hump-shaped relationship between our correlations and employer size. Finally, in the Management sector, observed correlation of worker and firm effects are positive, though small, and do not vary with employer size. In parallel, correlations in the Education and Accommodation sectors are negative and constant with respect to employer size. The sector labeled 'Other Services' looks like the French data, with very negative correlations at low employer sizes increasing toward essentially an zero correlation at the highest deciles of employer size.
It is important to note the measures taken to protect the confidentiality of respondents providing the underlying micro data. The U.S. data are protected by a distributionpreserving noise-infusion procedure. Each element of the microdata has been distorted in such a way that the individual observations are protected, yet the aggregate statistics we use in this analysis are still valid. For complete details of how this procedure works, see (Abowd et al. forthcoming) .
Structural Econometric Estimation
Parametrization
We specify the parameterizations of the fundamental elements of the coordination friction model: the number of workers of each type, the number of jobs, and the production function.
The workers
There are only M = 2 types of workers; the first parameter is α, the share of the type-1 persons in the population (α is of course between 0 and 1). The total number of employed workers J is known, but not the size of the population: we set the unemployment rate to be 10% (the results appear to be robust with respect to this parameter). Hence µ 1 = αJ/0.9, µ 2 = (1 − α)J/0.9.
The firms
In this estimation, we consider 10 different size categories for firms, and 2 different types of firms per size category. The model is thus built on 20 different types of firms. Hence the index n of the firms is in fact (s, j), where s = 1, ..., 10 is the size category and j = 1, 2 the type of the firm. The type of the firm represents a variation in the production function between productive and unproductive firms. The size categories are constructed so that there is the same number of employed workers J s in each size category. The number of jobs (vacant and filled) is not observed, but the number of employed workers is (by size category). We model the number of jobs as
where ν s,j is the number of jobs in firm (s, j), π s,j is the share of type-j firms in the size category s, σ s is the average size of the firms in size category s (σ s is increasing in s).
The production function
The output x m,(s,j) is parameterized as
This production function follows Shimer's requirement in that it is increasing in m if χ 1 > 0, is monotonous in s (increasing if φ > 0), and increasing in j if χ 2 > 0. χ 0 is fixed exogenously for identification purposes to be 0.1. We will require in the estimation that χ 1 > 0, χ 2 > 0. Since (s, j) is two-dimensional when n is one-dimensional, and because production must increase in n to apply Shimer's results, we sort output in increasing order at every stage of our estimation procedure along the (s, j) dimension.
Estimation
The model is highly nonlinear and does not admit closed form solutions without bringing in many more assumptions on the number and type of workers, as well as the type of production technology. To avoid bringing in more assumptions, we implement a heuristic computational approach to find the parameters that minimize the distance between the observed and simulated moments. For any choice of model parameters, we find the equilibrium queues by numerically solving the system of first-order conditions for the social planner's problem (equation (4). Once the queues are determined, a simple calculation of (5) yields the equilibrium wages. The actual employment levels, λ can also be solved from (6). We thus have all of the information needed to compute the theoretical moments (9), (10), (11) and reveal the distance between the theoretical moments given the parameters and the empirical moments. To find the minimizing parameters, we use the Adaptive Simulated Annealing (ASA) algorithm of Ingber (1993) . Table 2 shows the parameter estimates obtained from estimating the model on aggregate French and U.S. data. The parameter estimates themselves are not especially informative until they are used to derive the equilibrium wages, queue lengths and employment outcomes. However, there are several notable features. First, the parameter estimates for the U.S. and French data are broadly similar. Both samples indicate that the vast majority, roughly 95%, of workers in the economy are of low productivity. Both samples also estimate a very small role for firm size in the determination of output. By contrast, the U.S. estimate of the productivity difference between low and high productivity workers is about five times that in France, while in France the firm productivity effect is higher. The one other substantial difference between the two estimates is that in the U.S., it appears that the fraction of high type jobs is decreasing in the employer's size class, while the opposite is the case in the French data, where there is a strong positive effect of employer size on the fraction of high productivity jobs. Figures 5 and 6 show the equilibrium in each economy given the estimated model parameters. In each subplot, the x-axis enumerates the employer types. The points labeled 1 − 10 on the x-axis are the employers with low productive type, and points 11 − 20 are the employers of high type. The plot of log wages shows that in both economies, workers of high productive type are offered identical wages by every type of employer. Workers of low productive type earn higher wages in the high productivity firms. The plot of the equilibrium queue lengths shows how this affects worker behavior. Workers of both types are more likely to apply to jobs with higher productivity. For high productivity workers, since wage offers are all identical, it must also be the case that the probabilities of receiving any job conditional on applying for it are identical. The higher queue of high productivity applicants to high productivity jobs must just offset the higher queue of low productivity workers. Nevertheless, we can see that there is substantially more employment in firms of low type for both types of worker. This is broadly consistent with Shimer's claim that in a model with comparative advantage for low productivity workers in high productivity firms, workers of high type will be more likely to be employed in lower productivity firms. Figure  9 provides more evidence that the data are consistent with the model and its predictions. Formally, Shimer's claim is equivalently a claim that the employment probabilities are log submodular. If ǫ m,n = λm,n n λm,n is the fraction of workers of type m employed in firms of type n, the negative assortative matching implied by the model will satisfy the condition that for all n 2 > n 1 ǫ 1,n 1 ǫ 1,n 2 < ǫ 2,n 1 ǫ 2,n 2 (14) Figure 9 plots the ratio
Results
for each size-class for m = 1, 2. The graphical evidence is highly suggestive of the validity of the hypothesis of negative assortative matching.
Conclusion
We implemented a formal test of Shimer's model of job assignment in the presence of coordination frictions. The full structural model was estimated using the method of simulated moments. The estimated equilibrium correlation between individual and firm heterogeneity varies by size class of employer. For the U.S., these correlations range from slightly negative (smallest firm size) to zero. The pattern in the French data is essentially the same but the negative relation is somewhat stronger in the smallest sizes. Under the assumption that low-productivity workers have a comparative advantage in high-productivity firms, we find, consistent with Shimer's model, that high-productivity workers are more likely to be employed in less productive jobs.
Appendices A An Economy with Heterogeneous Workers and Firms
In this section we show how we can derive worker and firm effects in an economy with only two types of workers and a continuum of firms differing by size and production technology.
A.1 The Economy
Let the economy consist of two types of workers. This is not as limiting as it sounds, for it may only represent an heterogeneity inside a particular class of workers since we consider the effects net of observables.
The economy is divided in a finite numberk of industries. The workers are hired by a continuum of firms, indexed by the share x of type 1 workers each firm hires, the size t of the firm, and the industry k. The share x is unobserved by the econometrician. In industry k, there is a mass (density) µ k (x, t) of firms of type (k, x, t).
We omit from what follows the k index except when it is necessary. The economy as a whole is represented by the space Ω = {Ω 1 , . . . , Ωk} with Ω k = [0, 1] × R + , the space defining each industry. There is a quantity (or number) J = Ω dµ of firms, J k = Ω k dµ k in each industry. Firm (x, t) hires xt of type 1 workers, and (1 − x)t of type 2. We write Ω xt dµ(x, t) = M and Ω (1 − x)t dµ(x, t) = N so that there are M + N workers in the economy. Type 1 workers earn w(x, t, k) in firm (x, t) in industry k while type 2 earn u(x, t, k); the wage only depends on the industry, the share of type 1 workers, and the size of the firm.
A.2 The Economy as Estimated by Person and Firm Effects
As in AKM99 let us write the individual wage in each period of time as the sum of a person effect and a firm effect (after conditioning for observables).
However we consider here only the limiting (and purely theoretical) case where the number of time periods goes to infinity and the workers visit ergodically all firms and all industries. This frees us from the identification problem discussed in detail in the above paper. Moreover, the effects estimated in AKM99 would converge in probability to the theoretical values we show below.
In this case, even though the type of the worker is not directly known by the econometrician, observing the workers jump from job to job provides enough information to be able to reduce the above ordinary least squares (OLS) problem to the following minimization problem. Find W , U (worker effects) and ψ(k, x, t) (firm effect in industry k for a firm of size t hiring a proportion x of type 1 workers) that solve
This problem is exactly equivalent to minimizing the sum of squared residuals in ordinary least squares. The solutions to this problem are unique up to a constant. We show that:
Theorem 2 Under integrability assumptions on w and u, the solutions to the OLS program (15) are of the type
where the integrals are all taken on Ω with respect to the measure µ, and Λ is an arbitrary constant (we will set Λ = 0 in the rest of the paper).
Proof. Set U = 0 for the time being, as the solutions are only identified up to a constant. Let us write J(W, ψ) = Ω ρ(W, ψ)(x, t) dµ(x, t). J is defined on R × L 2 (Ω, µ), and may take the value +∞. It is clear that ρ is convex in its two arguments (as sum of two squares); hence J is also convex, and can be show to be strictly convex if w(x, t) − u(x, t) is not a constant. Hence it has a unique minimum under this assumption, characterized by the first order constraints
Hence W = xt(w − ψ) dµ/ xt dB and ψ = x(w − W ) + (1 − x)u. Replacing ψ by this last value in equation 19 and simplifying with the fact that x 2 t = M − x(1 − x)t and x 2 tw = xtw − x(1 − x)w proves the theorem.
Remark 3 (Some special cases) If all firms hire the same number of both types of workers, the distribution µ k for all k is δ 1/2,2 , a Dirac distribution of firms of equal size and same number of type 1 workers. This leads to
, where w k is the wage in industry k. The case where the distribution µ has all mass in t at t = 2 and w(x, t) = u(x, t) + δ leads to W = U +δ and ψ(x, t) = u(x) − U.
We define the firm-employee effects covariances cov(θ,ψ) as
For total covariance the integrals are taken over Ω, for within-sector covariance over Ω k for all k, and the between-sector covariance is the discrete covariance between the means (i.e. integrals) on the Ω k . Total covariance is as usual the sum of between-sector and within-sector covariances.
B Data Appendix
We use data from the Déclarations annuelles des donnés sociales (DADS), a 1/25th sample of the French work force with information from 1976-1996, and data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics Program (LEHD), universe data for four large American States with information from 1990-2003.
B.1 The DADS Data
The "Déclarations Annuelles des Salaires" are a large collection of matched employer-employee information collected by INSEE (Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques) and maintained in the Division des Revenus. The data are based on a mandatory employer report of the gross earnings of each employee subject to French payroll taxes. The universe includes all employed persons. Our analysis sample covers all individuals employed in French enterprises who were born in October of even-numbered years, with civil servants excluded. Our extract runs from 1976 through 1996, with 1981, 1983 and 1990 excluded because the extracts were not built for those years. The initial data set contained 16 millions observations. Each observation corresponds to a unique enterprise-individual-year combination. The observation includes an identifier that corresponds to the employee (called NNI below) and an identifier that corresponds to the enterprise (SIREN). For each observation, we have information on the number of days during the calendar year the individual worked in the establishment, as well as the full-time/part-time/intermittent/at home work-status of the employee. Each observation also includes, in addition to the variables listed above, the sex, month year and place of birth, occupation, total net nominal earnings during the year and annualized gross nominal earnings during the year for the individual, as well as the location and industry of the employing establishment. Observation selection, variable creation, and imputation: An observation is identified by a combination of two identifiers, the firm' id and the person's id. The SIREN number has an internal structure that allows to check for coding errors. But, the NNI number has no such internal control. Even though 90% of today's DADS files is sent by the responding firm using an electronic support (tape or diskette), the situation in the eighties was quite different. Therefore, INSEE had to enter the data into computers. Entry errors in the NNI occurred (exchange in two digits of the NNI, error in one of the digits,...). This phenomenon is well-known at INSEE but, despite many attempts, no general way of solving this problem was found. As a consequence, some observations have a NNI-year-SIREN combination such that no other observation has the same NNI. As a joint product, some NNI-SIREN combinations have a unique missing year. Consider now the case of a worker with observations in, say, 1978 and 1980 in the same enterprise (SIREN) but no observation for 1979. To be true, this would mean that the worker would be employed until some date in 1978 (depending on the number of days worked, December 31 most likely) and also employed after some date in 1980 (depending on the number of days worked, January 1 most likely) in this firm but not employed at all during year 1979. This is very improbable. In particular, because there is layoff-type procedure in France in which workers may be recalled by their firms after some period of unemployment. Suggestions of D. Verger (head of the Division Revenus, in charge of the DADS at the beginning of the nineties) led us to adopt the following solution. Whenever an observation was missing in a given year while the same NNI-SIREN combination exists for the preceding and the following year, we created an observation for the missing year with the same NNI-SIREN combination. (We added 193, 148 observations) . Earnings are computed as the geometric mean of the preceding and following wages (in real terms). All other variables are taken at their preceding year value.
Because of the 1982 and 1990 Census, the 1981 , 1983 and 1990 DADS data were not available. We used the same principle as the one described above to impute missing observations. Hence, imputation was performed only for those individuals that were present in the same firm in 1980 and 1982 or 1982 and 1984 or 1989 and 1991 observations in the sample). All variables were imputed as above.
Multiple jobs: Until now, nothing in our procedure rules out multiple jobs holding. Multiple jobs are difficult to handle in our dataset because we only have information on the number of days worked in each NNI-year-SIREN combination. Hence, we do not know the starting and the ending date of the spell in that year (for all spells that last less than 360 days, the maximum). To be able to build spells of employment for each worker, we only kept those individuals that never had strictly more than three employers in any year. We computed the number of employers any worker had in a year. We kept in our analysis file those workers who had at most three different employers in each year. At this stage, our sample only contains workers who hold at most three simultaneous jobs in a given year. Then, we computed the sum of all days worked in each year. If this number was strictly larger than 720 days for some year, i.e. the worker necessarily had three simultaneous jobs at some point of this year, we deleted the individual from our sample.
We define a job spell as an uninterrupted period of employment for a given NNI in a given SIREN over, possibly, many years.
Beginning and end of job spells:
Since workers have at most three job spells in a year, the possible sequence of job spells are limited. This allows us to compute exactly the beginning and the end of a job spell. First, we identified for each individual the starting and the end years of a job spell. Then, we ordered these sequences. The different cases are the following:
• When a job spell starts in year t but ends after December 31 of the same year, we compute the starting date within year t as (360 − DP t )/360 where DP t denotes the number of days worked in year t.
• The end date within year t of a spell is computed symmetrically if the spell started before year t as (DP t − 360)/360.
• When a spell starts and ends the same year,and if there is no simultaneous job this year, the spell starts at the beginning of the year (January 1).
• When a worker has multiple spells that all start and end the same year, we assume that the sequence of job spells is organized as follows. As long as the sum of days worked in this year is smaller or equal to 360, the job spells are put in sequence one after the other, the first one starting January 1. Any spell with a number of days worked, DP 1,t such that DP 1,t + DP k,t > 360 where k = 2, 3 (the other two potential spells) is also placed January 1. This finishes when the three spells (maximum possible) have been taken care of.
• If a job spell ends in year t but started at some previous date, any other job spell that took place the same year t will start at the end of this spell if the total number of days worked for these two spells is smaller or equal to 360 but starts January 1 otherwise. The third spell, if it exists, is placed after the first of the two spells for which the sum is smaller or equal to 360.
• The symmetric principles apply whenever a spell starts in year t and ends after December 31 for all spells that took place in year t.
At the end of this procedure, whenever a worker held three jobs simultaneously (think of a worker with three spells in a given year that all last 200 days), all his (her) observations were deleted. Altogether, both procedures for finding workers holding three simultaneous jobs or more eliminated from the sample 2,223,859 observations that correspond to 115,637 workers.
Job seniority: Individuals fell into two categories with respect to the calculation of job seniority: those for whom the first year of observation was in 1976 with 360 worked days in that year and those that appear in the sample after this date or had less than 360 days of work in 1976. For the first category, we estimated the expected length of the in-progress employment spell by regression analysis using a supplementary survey, the 1978 Enquête sur la Structure des Salaires (ESS, Salary Structure Survey). In this survey, respondent establishments provided information on seniority, occupation, date of birth, industry, and work location for a scientific sample of their employees. Using this information, Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (ibid.) estimated separate regressions for men and women that we use to predict seniority for the in-progress spells in 1976 with 360 days worked (all coefficients are reported in Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis, ibid., see in particular the data appendix).
Finally, as in Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (ibid.), we eliminated observations for which the logarithm of the real annualized total compensation cost was more than five standard deviations away from its predicted value based on a linear regression model of this variable on sex, region, experience, and education (see once more the data appendix in Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis, ibid.) .
Having done all these selections and imputations, the final data set that we use contains 13,770,082 observations, corresponding to 1,682,080 individuals and 515,557 firms. Table  A .1 (to be built) in the appendix describes the structure of the data.
B.2 The LEHD Data
As mentioned above, we utilize the LEHD Program's Employment Dynamics Estimates database which is described briefly below. See Abowd et al. (2004) and Abowd et al. (forthcoming) for more detailed discussions.
Unemployment Insurance:
The individual data were derived from the universe of unemployment insurance (UI) quarterly wage records from four of the following seven states: California, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, North Carolina, and Texas.
3 The BLS Handbook of Methods (1997) describes UI coverage as "broad and basically comparable from state to state," and claims over 96 percent of total wage and salary civilian jobs were covered in 1994. The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), first enacted in 1938, lays the ground rules for the kinds of employment which must be covered in state unemployment insurance laws. While technically mandating coverage of all employers with one or more employees in a calendar year, FUTA allows for numerous exceptions to covered employment (Stevens 2002) . These include workers at small agricultural co-operatives, employees of the Federal government, and certain employees of state governments, most notably elected officials, members of the judiciary, and emergency workers. According to the Handbook, UI wage records measure "gross wages and salaries, bonuses, stock options, tips, and other gratuities, and the value of meals and lodging, where supplied." They do not include OASDI, health insurance, workers compensation, unemployment insurance, and private pension and welfare funds. Individuals are uniquely identified and followed for all quarters in which their employers had reporting requirements in the UI system. Thus, cross-state mobility can be observed for individuals moving between any of the seven states for which we have data. Although coverage dates vary, all states provide between seven and thirteen years of data. Table 1 in Abowd et al. (2003) (ALM, hereafter) details the starting dates and number of individuals appearing in each of these states up to the year 2000. In our analysis, by combining them into a single "pooled" file, we have information on approximately 75 million workers, accounting for over 40% of the U.S. workforce.
Creation of Variables:
Using Census Bureau and other LEHD data bases, sex, race, date of birth, and education are combined with the individual earnings data.
4 When a variable was created with an exact link to another database, the actual value from that data source is used. When a variable was created with a statistical link to another database, the value of the variable is imputed 10 times, thereby providing information on the precision of the statistical links. Upon each individual's first appearance in the data, labor force experience as potential labor force experience (age -education -6) is calculated. In subsequent periods, experience is measured as the sum of observed experience and initial (potential) experience. The UI wage records connect individuals to every employer from which they received wages in any quarter of a given calendar year. Therefore, individual employment histories are constructed using the same personal identifier used in the individual data. Employers are identified by their state unemployment insurance account number (SEIN). While large employers undoubtedly operate in multiple states, their SEINs are unfortunately state specific, meaning they cannot be connected. In addition, while we match workers to their employers, it is not possible to connect those employed in firms with multiple establishments to specific places of work. This problem is not overly pervasive, as over 70% of employment occurs in firms with only a single establishment. There are approximately 4.7 million firms in this version of the data.
Earnings: For every year an individual appears in a state, a "dominant" employer -the employer for whom the sum of quarterly earnings is the highest-is identified in order to better approximate the individual's full-time, full-year annual wage rate using the following steps. First, define full quarter employment in quarter t as having an employment history with positive earnings for quarters t − 1, t, and t + 1. Continuous employment during quarter t means having an employment history with positive earnings for either t − 1 and t or t and t + 1. Employment spells that are neither full quarter nor continuous are designated discontinuous. If the individual was full quarter employed for at least one quarter at the dominant employer, the annualized wage is computed as 4 times average full quarter earnings at that employer (total full quarter earnings divided by the number of full quarters worked). This accounts for 84% of the person-year-state observations in our eventual analysis sample. Otherwise, if the individual was continuously employed for at least one quarter at the dominant employer, the annualized wage is average earnings in all continuous quarters of employment at the dominant employer multiplied by 8 (i.e., 4 quarters divided by an expected employment duration during the continuous quarters of 0.5). This accounts for 11% of all observations. For the remaining 5%, annualized wages are average earnings in each quarter multiplied by 12 (i.e., 4 quarters divided by an expected employment duration during discontinuous quarters of 0.33).
Annual Hours of Work and Full-time Status: We restrict our sample to individuals who worked full-time for their dominant employer. Full-time status is taken to mean that the individual worked at least 35 hours per week. The average number of hours per week for a worker is given by dividing the number of hours worked over the year with the dominant employer by the number of weeks worked. The number of weeks worked is approximated based on the observed number of full, continuous, and discontinuous quarters with one's dominant employer. Specifically, we compute weeks worked as 13 times the number of full quarters + 6.5 times the number of continuous quarters + 4.33 times the number of discontinuous quarters. Annual hours of work are observed for a subset of individuals in the sample via a database link to other LEHD and Census sources. For those missing annual hours of work, a value is statistically assigned using a Bayesian multiple imputation procedure. Bjelland (2007) provides complete details of the imputation of annual hours of work.
Our analysis sample is restricted to individuals aged 18-70, employed full-time at their dominant employer. Table C presents sample means for several earnings, demographic, industry, and labor force attachment variables for the period 1990-2000. The final analysis sample contains 278 million person-year-state observations for the aforementioned 75 million individuals and 4.7 million firms. In comparison to the base LEHD file, this analysis file has considerably higher wages and earnings, and is slightly more educated, male, white, and experienced. Parameter estimates derived by minimizing the distance between the theoretical and empirical moments using Lester Ingber's Adaptive Simulated Annealing (ASA) algorithm (Ingber 1993) . Standard Errors in progress.
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